Cualquier propuesta de alternativa a la democracia representativa, sea para mejorarla, sea para sustituirla por otro tipo de forma política, debería de tomar en cuenta dos tipos de restricciones para que la alternativa en cuestión tenga mayores probabilidades de éxito. Al primer grupo de restricciones los llamaremos factores limitantes de la conducta humana, mientras que al segundo grupo los llamaremos funciones impropias de esa forma política, es decir, las funciones que no debería tener. Tanto los factores limitantes de la conducta (...) humana como las funciones impropias de una forma política son restricciones sobre lo que realmente, es decir, no utópicamente, podríamos hacer para mejorar a la democracia y en general a la gobernabilidad de las sociedades. Esas restricciones, que a continuación señalaré, constituyen los argumentos que me llevan a plantear la siguiente tesis: la democracia representativa puede y debe ser mejorada al reducir su alcance económico, político y social, pero continúa siendo una mejor opción de gobierno que cualquier alternativa, incluyendo la demarquía. (shrink)

In this paper, I consider the relationship between Inference to the Best Explanation and Bayesianism, both of which are well-known accounts of the nature of scientific inference. In Sect. 2, I give a brief overview of Bayesianism and IBE. In Sect. 3, I argue that IBE in its most prominently defended forms is difficult to reconcile with Bayesianism because not all of the items that feature on popular lists of “explanatory virtues”—by means of which IBE ranks competing explanations—have confirmational import. (...) Rather, some of the items that feature on these lists are “informational virtues”—properties that do not make a hypothesis \ more probable than some competitor \ given evidence E, but that, roughly-speaking, give that hypothesis greater informative content. In Sect. 4, I consider as a response to my argument a recent version of compatibilism which argues that IBE can provide further normative constraints on the objectively correct probability function. I argue that this response does not succeed, owing to the difficulty of defending with any generality such further normative constraints. Lastly, in Sect. 5, I propose that IBE should be regarded, not as a theory of scientific inference, but rather as a theory of when we ought to “accept” H, where the acceptability of H is fixed by the goals of science and concerns whether H is worthy of commitment as research program. In this way, IBE and Bayesianism, as I will show, can be made compatible, and thus the Bayesian and the proponent of IBE can be friends. (shrink)

In the last two decades, a robust consensus has emerged among philosophers of science, whereby political, ethical, or social values must play some role in scientific inquiry, and that the ‘value-free ideal’ is thus a misguided conception of science. However, the question of how to distinguish, in a principled way, which values may legitimately influence science remains. This question, which has been dubbed the ‘new demarcation problem,’ has until recently received comparatively less attention from philosophers of science. In this paper, (...) I appeal to Rawls’s theory of justice (1971) on the basis of which I defend a Rawlsian solution to the new demarcation problem. As I argue, the Rawlsian solution places plausible constraints on which values ought to influence scientific inquiry, and, moreover, can be fruitfully applied to concrete cases to determine how the conflicting interests of stakeholders should be balanced. After considering and responding to the objection that Rawls’s theory of justice applies only to the “basic structure” of society, I compare the Rawlsian solution to some other approaches to the new demarcation problem, especially those that emphasize democratic criteria. (shrink)

This paper aims to contribute to the existing literature on normative cognition by providing a lineage explanation of human social norm psychology. This approach builds upon theories of goal-directed behavioral control in the reinforcement learning and control literature, arguing that this form of control defines an important class of intentional normative mental states that are instrumental in nature. I defend the view that great ape capacities for instrumental reasoning and our capacity (or family of capacities) for shared intentionality coadapted to (...) each other and argue that the evolution of this capacity has allowed the representation of social norms and the emergence of our capacity for normative guidance. (shrink)

In this article, I consider an important challenge to the popular theory of scientific inference commonly known as ‘inference to the best explanation’, one that has received scant attention.1 1 The problem is that there exists a wide array of rival models of explanation, thus leaving IBE objectionably indeterminate. First, I briefly introduce IBE. Then, I motivate the problem and offer three potential solutions, the most plausible of which is to adopt a kind of pluralism about the rival models of (...) explanation. However, I argue that how ranking explanations on this pluralistic account of IBE remains obscure and pluralism leads to contradictory results. In light of these objections, I attempt to dissolve the problem by showing why IBE does not require a ‘model’ of explanation and by giving an account of what explanation consists in within the context of IBE. (shrink)

In this paper, I offer an analysis of the radical disagreement over the adequacy of string theory. The prominence of string theory despite its notorious lack of empirical support is sometimes explained as a troubling case of science gone awry, driven largely by sociological mechanisms such as groupthink (e.g. Smolin 2006). Others, such as Dawid (2013), explain the controversy by positing a methodological revolution of sorts, according to which string theorists have quietly turned to nonempirical methods of theory assessment given (...) the technological inability to directly test the theory. The appropriate response, according to Dawid, is to acknowledge this development and widen the canons of acceptable scientific methods. As I’ll argue, however, the current situation in fundamental physics does not require either of these responses. Rather, as I’ll suggest, much of the controversy stems from a failure to properly distinguish the “context of justification” from the “context of pursuit”. Both those who accuse string theorists of betraying the scientific method and those who advocate an enlarged conception of scientific methodology objectionably conflate epistemic justification with judgements of pursuit-worthiness. Once we get clear about this distinction and about the different norms governing the two contexts, the current situation in fundamental physics becomes much less puzzling. After defending this diagnosis of the controversy, I’ll show how the argument patterns that have been posited by Dawid as constituting an emergent methodological revolution in science are better off if reworked as arguments belonging to the context of pursuit. (shrink)

The historical avant-gardes showed that it is in the syntactic space where the mutations of art occur, where the creative potentialities in contemporary art are played. Hence the need to accentuate the syntactic creation registers in the works of the Estridentistas. There is no creation of images, rhythms, words, atmospheres, sound orientations, planes or political-literary postures that are valid apart from the syntax effects in which the poems of Manuel Maples Arce, Germán List, Salvador Gallardo and Kyn-Taniya take place, the (...) paintings, engravings and sculptures by Fermín Revueltas, Ramón Alva de la Canal, Germán Cueto and Leopoldo Méndez, the novels and essays by Arqueles Vela, the pieces from the Estridentista period by Silvestre Revueltas, the plays by Salvador Gallardo and Germán Cueto. The syntax is the tracing of indirect paths created in each poem, installation, plastic or musical work, to show life in things; those forces, paths and paths that, when going from life to language, create a work. It is, therefore, a speed. I don't use "speed" as a metaphor. It is the speeds that interdigitate events, images, objects; those that relate and stress semantic, sound, semiotic and social forces, paths and trajectories. Velocity is the gradient of the syntax, the relationship between phenomena, the variation of the elements according to a certain direction, the trajectory medium, the semantic loads and the systems of signs: it is not necessary to think that the syntactic effects are something like general mechanisms that precede poems, plastic and musical works. A new syntactic speed detaches itself as much as it can from what is constituted and seeks to bring poetic, pictorial, musical language to its threshold of meaning, informational or communication, to its referential, rhythmic, constructive threshold. Therefore, it should not be confused with acceleration. Slowness is a speed, as in Handke's writing or in some sections of Tarr's films. (shrink)

In this article, I will provide a critical overview of the form of non-deductive reasoning commonly known as “Inference to the Best Explanation” (IBE). Roughly speaking, according to IBE, we ought to infer the hypothesis that provides the best explanation of our evidence. In section 2, I survey some contemporary formulations of IBE and highlight some of its putative applications. In section 3, I distinguish IBE from C.S. Peirce’s notion of abduction. After underlining some of the essential elements of IBE, (...) the rest of the entry is organized around an examination of various problems that IBE confronts, along with some extant attempts to address these problems. In section 4, I consider the question of when a fact requires an explanation, since presumably IBE applies only in cases where some explanation is called for. In section 5, I consider the difficult question of how we ought to understand IBE in light of the fact that among philosophers, there is significant disagreement about what constitutes an explanation. In section 6, I consider different strategies for justifying the truth-conduciveness of the explanatory virtues, e.g., simplicity, unification, scope, etc., criteria which play an indispensable role in any given application of IBE. In section 7, I survey some of the most recent literature on IBE, much of which consists of investigations of the status of IBE from the standpoint of the Bayesian philosophy of science. (shrink)

This paper is a contribution to graded model theory, in the context of mathematical fuzzy logic. We study characterizations of classes of graded structures in terms of the syntactic form of their first-order axiomatization. We focus on classes given by universal and universal-existential sentences. In particular, we prove two amalgamation results using the technique of diagrams in the setting of structures valued on a finite MTL-algebra, from which analogues of the Łoś–Tarski and the Chang–Łoś–Suszko preservation theorems follow.

This thesis focuses on the evolution of human social norm psychology. More precisely, I want to show how the emergence of our distinctive capacity to follow social norms and make social normative judgments is connected to the lineage explanation of our capacity to form shared intentions, and how such capacity is related to a diverse cluster of prototypical moral judgments. I argue that in explaining the evolution of this form of normative cognition we also require an understanding of the developmental (...) trajectory of this capacity. For this purpose, the thesis is organized as follow. In the first chapter, I make some methodological remarks and provide the general overview and plan for the dissertation. In the second chapter, I explain what my explanatory target is and why it matters. On the view I am defending, shared intentional psychology gives rise to a special form of psychology that enables us to engage in social normative thinking. These norms are represented as shared intentional states. Moral psychology, in contrast, is more diverse. For moral judgments define a quite heterogeneous class of mental states—although some moral judgments may involve the representation and execution of norms, certainly not all of them do. I show that although much of our distinctive social norm psychology can be explained within the framework of shared intentionality, moral judgments cannot be unified in the same way. In the third chapter, I provide the baseline of social-cognitive capacities that serve as starting point for my lineage explanation. I argue that hominin social cognition was for a very long period of our evolutionary history essentially a matter of low-level cognitive and motivational processes. On this picture, bottom-up affective processes regulated the social lives of early hominins without requiring any special top-down mechanism of normative thinking such as a capacity for understanding and representing social norms. In the fourth chapter, I argue that human-like social norm psychology evolved as a result of the selective pressures that gave rise to shared intentionality, especially the demands that came from collective hunting. Yet collective hunting was not the whole story of the evolution of shared intentionality, for our capacity to form shared intentional mental states emerged from the interplay between the selective pressures that led to cooperative breeding in humans as well as organized, goal-oriented, collective hunting. Thus, I propose an evo-devo account of shared intentionality and its normative dimension since I argue that explaining the evolution of this particular form of normative thinking crucially depends on information about the developmental trajectory of this capacity. Finally, in the fifth chapter, I focus on how social norms are acquired and how the way we learn them gives rise to some prototypical cluster of moral judgments. Thus, this chapter returns to some of themes and arguments of the first chapter by explaining how the distinction between moral judgments and nonmoral judgments can be culturally transmitted. (shrink)

An essay on the operation of the powers of control during the pandemic lockdown. Thus, the meaning of contemporary noise, the anthropause, the connection as a norm, the appearance of a new chain between biopolitical regulations, norms and subjective modulations are analyzed. The untimely force of the event is proposed as a way of resisting control. -/- Un ensayo sobre el funcionamiento de los poderes de control durante el encierro pandémico. Se analizan, así, el sentido del ruido contemporáneo, la antropausa, (...) la conexión como norma, la aparición de un nuevo encadenamiento entre regulaciones biopolíticas, normas y modulaciones subjetivas. Se propone la fuerza intempestiva del acontecimiento como forma de resistir al control. (shrink)

In this chapter, I approach the anticipatory character of experience and the possibility of focusing on the present from the viewpoint of Husserlian phenomenology. I do this by analyzing in particular the emotional dimension of expectations. In the framework of Husserlian phenomenology, the concept of emotional expectation describes a subject´s orientation toward what is coming as an affective tension, that is, an emotional way of “being tensed” toward the future. The general aim of the chapter is thus to explore the (...) possible contributions of Husserl´s analyses of the relation between different temporal phases of consciousness to the debate in the context of mindfulness about the possibility of focusing on the now moment and observing and regulating emotions. First, I will present the concept of emotional expectation and the anticipatory dimension of time-consciousness in Husserl’s phenomenology. This requires clarifying the specific emotional character of expectations, that is, explaining how expectations are to be understood in the emotional sphere, in terms of how they both differ from and intertwine with intellectual expectations. Second, I will provide an overview of the sedimentation of feelings in emotional dispositions and of the “resonance” of feelings. Finally, I will refer to the role of attention in redirecting consciousness to the now, and in the observation of emotions. In this regard, I will argue that, even though every experience involves past, present, and future temporal modes, attention can favor what is given in the now and can intervene in order to observe emotions as they are going on. In general terms, I will try to describe the passive genesis of disposition that predelineates present experience and expectations regarding the future, and also to explore the possibility of actively intervening from the present to reconfigure this passive predelineation. (shrink)

In this paper, I critically evaluate several related, provocative claims made by proponents of data-intensive science and “Big Data” which bear on scientific methodology, especially the claim that scientists will soon no longer have any use for familiar concepts like causation and explanation. After introducing the issue, in Section 2, I elaborate on the alleged changes to scientific method that feature prominently in discussions of Big Data. In Section 3, I argue that these methodological claims are in tension with a (...) prominent account of scientific method, often called “Inference to the Best Explanation”. Later on, in Section 3, I consider an argument against IBE that will be congenial to proponents of Big Data, namely, the argument due to Roche and Sober Analysis, 73:659–668, that “explanatoriness is evidentially irrelevant.” This argument is based on Bayesianism, one of the most prominent general accounts of theory-confirmation. In Section 4, I consider some extant responses to this argument, especially that of Climenhaga Philosophy of Science, 84:359–368,. In Section 5, I argue that Roche and Sober’s argument does not show that explanatory reasoning is dispensable. In Section 6, I argue that there is good reason to think explanatory reasoning will continue to prove indispensable in scientific practice. Drawing on Cicero’s oft-neglected De Divinatione, I formulate what I call the “Ciceronian Causal-nomological Requirement”, which states, roughly, that causal-nomological knowledge is essential for relying on correlations in predictive inference. I defend a version of the CCR by appealing to the challenge of “spurious correlations,” chance correlations which we should not rely upon for predictive inference. In Section 7, I offer some concluding remarks. (shrink)

Philosophy, it is said, has always been concerned with space and nature. Since Aristotle, even since the pre-Socratics, and up to Descartes and Leibniz at least, no one was worthy of the title of philosopher if he had not written something about meteors. And not only about meteors: observations on the movements of the Earth and changes in nature, changes of state or speed, transitions and contacts between strange elements, spatial geometrical properties, the order of coexistences - their limits - (...) and the correspondences between scales; force and matter, constructive typologies and geomorphology were an indissoluble part of the philosophical field. It is not that philosophy reflected on these external themes, but that these themes formed the fabric of the philosophical body. What happened, then, between the end of the seventeenth century and the first half of the eighteenth century? How did the themes related to space and nature become diluted and disappear from philosophical discourses? It is not a question of the split between man and nature, ancient and incommensurable, but of the separation of nature itself, modern and discontinuous, by means of which it was placed alongside the barren, the inert, as a category. -/- La filosofía, se dice, se ocupó siempre de los espacios y de la naturaleza. Desde Aristóteles, incluso desde los presocráticos, y hasta Descartes y Leibniz por lo menos, nadie era digno del título de filósofo si no había escrito algo sobre los meteoros. Y no sólo sobre los meteoros: las observaciones sobre los movimientos de la Tierra y la mudanza en la naturaleza, los cambios de estado o de velocidad, las transiciones y los contactos entre elementos extraños, las propiedades geométricas espaciales, el orden de las coexistencias —sus límites— y las correspondencias entre las escalas; la fuerza y la materia, las tipologías constructivas y la geomorfología formaban parte indisoluble del campo filosófico. No es que la filosofía reflexionase sobre esos temas externos, sino que esos temas formaban el tejido del cuerpo filosófico. ¿Qué sucedió, entonces, entre el final del siglo XVII y la primera mitad del siglo XVIII? ¿Cómo fue que los temas relacionados con el espacio y la naturaleza se diluyeron y desaparecieron de los discursos filosóficos? No se trata de la escisión entre hombre y naturaleza, antigua e inconmensurable, sino de la separación de sí de la naturaleza misma, moderna y discontinua, por medio de la cual fue puesta al lado de lo yerto, lo inerte, como una categoría. (shrink)

Alleged self-evidence aside, conceivability arguments are one of the main reasons in favor of the claim that there is a Hard Problem. These arguments depend on the appealing Kripkean intuition that there is no difference between appearances and reality in the case of consciousness. I will argue that this intuition rests on overlooking a distinction between cognitive access and consciousness, which has received recently important empirical support. I will show that there are good reasons to believe that the intuition is (...) misguided—at least on the reading that the conceivability arguments require—and hence that the arguments are unsupported. This, in turn, alleviates the Hard Problem but leaves us with what I think is a not easy problem. (shrink)

In this paper, I examine Cicero’s oft-neglected De Divinatione, a dialogue investigating the legitimacy of the practice of divination. First, I offer a novel analysis of the main arguments for divination given by Quintus, highlighting the fact that he employs two logically distinct argument forms. Next, I turn to the first of the main arguments against divination given by Marcus. Here I show, with the help of modern probabilistic tools, that Marcus’ skeptical response is far from the decisive, proto-naturalistic assault (...) on superstition that it is sometimes portrayed to be. Then, I offer an extended analysis of the second of the main arguments against divination given by Marcus. Inspired by Marcus’ second main argument, I formulate, explicate, and defend a substantive principle of scientific methodology that I call the “Ciceronian Causal-Nomological Requirement” (CCR). Roughly, this principle states that causal knowledge is essential for relying on correlations in predictive inference. Although I go on to argue that Marcus’ application of the CCR in his debate with Quintus is dialectically inadequate, I conclude that De Divinatione deserves its place in Cicero’s philosophical corpus, and that ultimately, its significance for the history and philosophy of science ought to be recognized. (shrink)

In this paper, I describe some strategies for teaching an introductory philosophy of science course to Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics (STEM) students, with reference to my own experience teaching a philosophy of science course in the Fall of 2020. The most important strategy that I advocate is what I call the “Second Philosophy” approach, according to which instructors ought to emphasize that the problems that concern philosophers of science are not manufactured and imposed by philosophers from the outside, but (...) rather are ones that arise internally, during the practice of science itself. To justify this approach, I appeal to considerations from both educational research and the epistemology of testimony. In addition, I defend some distinctive learning goals that philosophy of science instructors ought to adopt when teaching STEM students, which include rectifying empirically well-documented shortcomings in students’ conceptions of the “scientific method” and the “nature of science.” Although my primary focus will be on teaching philosophy of science to STEM students, much of what I propose can be applied to non-philosophy majors generally. Ultimately, as I argue, a successful philosophy of science course for non-philosophy majors must be one that advances a student’s science education. The strategies that I describe and defend here are aimed at precisely that end. (shrink)

The topic of fake news has received increased attention from philosophers since the term became a favorite of politicians (Habgood-Coote 2016; Dentith 2016). Notably missing from the conversation, however, is a discussion of fake news and conspiracy theory media as a market. This paper will take as its starting point the account of noxious markets put forward by Debra Satz (2010), and will argue that there is a pro tanto moral reason to restrict the market for fake news. Specifically, we (...) begin with Satz’s argument that restricting a market may be required when i) that market inhibits citizens from being able to stand in an equal relationship with one another, and ii) this problem cannot be solved without such direct restrictions. Our own argument then proceeds in three parts: first, we argue that the market for fake news fits Satz’s description of a noxious market; second, we argue against explanations of the proliferation of fake news that are couched in terms of “epistemic vice”, and likewise argue against prescribing critical thinking education as a solution to the problem; finally, we conclude that, in the absence of other solutions to mitigate the noxious effects of the fake news market, we have a pro tanto moral reason to impose restrictions on this market. At the end of the paper, we consider one proposal to regulate the fake news market, which involves making social media outlets potentially liable in civil court for damages caused by the fake news hosted on their websites. (shrink)

Here, I consider the recent application of phylogenetic methods in historical linguistics. After a preliminary survey of one such method, i.e. cladistic parsimony, I respond to two common criticisms of cultural phylogenies: that cultural artifacts cannot be modeled as tree-like because of borrowing across lineages, and that the mechanism of cultural change differs radically from that of biological evolution. I argue that while perhaps remains true for certain cultural artifacts, the nature of language may be such as to side-step this (...) objection. Moreover, I explore the possibility that cladistic parsimony can be justified even if is true by appealing to the inference pattern known among philosophers as ‘Inference to the Best Explanation’. (shrink)

The year 2021 marked the commemoration of the centenary of the appearance of the stridentist movement and the literary avant-garde in Mexico. Stridentism broke into the public con- sciousness with the publication of the leaflet Actual No 1 on the main thoroughfares of Mexico City, convulsing the cultural en- vironment of the early 1920s and bringing together diverse young artists to undertake a literary renewal. This facsimile edition of Actual No 3, the final issue of Manuel Maples Arce’s magazine, which (...) appeared a hundred years ago this year and which until very recently was practically unknown, seeks to bring to the pub- lic something that is at once a singular avant-garde object and a magazine that expressed, at a very early stage, the cosmopolitan, iconoclastic, youthful character of stridentism and its time. "Stridentist Neo-object Actual No 3" is a essay that shows that from foundationless things and objects without gravitation to recomposed neo-objects emerges one of the lengthiest, rup- tured, polyhedric mutations in all fields of knowledge. The historical avant-gardes worked precisely in the turning of the tide on auratic objects that led to the appearance of neo-objects or recomposed objects. In their approach to objects, they tried var- ious operations: they deepened the depresentification of “natural” or “given” things, seeking—in some cases—dematerialization, the simultaneity of planes, the breakdown of logical links, while in others they the sought the primacy of the concept. They created multidimensional neo-objects shot through with events, on the scales of spaces, from the juxtaposed to the dislocated, the simultaneous contiguous to the dispersed, and the close to the distant. They criticized objects and materials they saw as bourgeois, auratic, and linked to ancient traditions and techniques. They created new syntactic velocities through which they interdigitated technical objects newly fashioned by human sensibility. (shrink)

Filósofos como Marcuse han subrayado las propiedades liberadoras del quehacer artístico. Pero si hemos de pensar el arte como el Gran Rechazo, es necesario mostrar qué rechaza el arte y con qué busca sustituirlo. Respecto a estas preguntas, existen dos respuestas antagónicas. Mientras una busca en la experiencia artística rechazar lo dado en nombre de una verdad intemporal, la otra también reniega de lo dado, pero admite el carácter provisorio de toda verdad. Aunque en apariencia sutil, esta distinción es sustancial. (...) A partir de una lectura de Platón, muestro por qué en la primera posición no hay cabida para lo humano, y por qué de ella se desprenden implicaciones totalitarias. Para caracterizar a la segunda posición, me sirvo de la concepción estética de Octavio Paz y de la propuesta escultórica de Alexander Calder. Ambas propuestas permiten conciliar la insatisfacción que palpita en el arte con la alteridad que caracteriza a lo humano. (shrink)

In this paper, I discuss the ways in which epistemic anxiety promotes well-being, specifically by examining the positive contributions that feelings of epistemic anxiety make toward intellectually virtuous inquiry. While the prospects for connecting the concept of epistemic anxiety to the two most prominent accounts of intellectual virtue, i.e., “virtue-reliabilism” and “virtue-responsibilism”, are promising, I primarily focus on whether the capacity for epistemic anxiety counts as an intellectual virtue in the reliabilist sense. As I argue, there is a close yet (...) unexplored connection between feelings of epistemic anxiety and the form of inference commonly known as “Inference to the Best Explanation” (IBE). Specifically, I argue that both the recognition that some fact requires an explanation—a necessary first step in applying IBE—and the subsequent motivation to employ IBE are typically facilitated by feelings of epistemic anxiety. So, provided IBE is truth-conducive the capacity for epistemic anxiety should count as an intellectual virtue in the reliabilist sense. After outlining my main argument, I address the challenge that the capacity for epistemic anxiety has the potential to be misleading. To respond to this challenge, I discuss how our recognition that a fact requires an explanation must in part be a species of practical knowledge, rather than theoretical knowledge. For the agent to skillfully distinguish between facts that require an explanation and facts that do not, she must develop the virtuous disposition to feel the appropriate amount of epistemic anxiety. Despite the many negative aspects associated with anxiety, as I conclude, being disposed to feel the appropriate amount of epistemic anxiety is ultimately good for us. (shrink)

Los sótanos del universo plantea la necesidad de cambiar la epistemología del conocimiento apodíctico científico-filosófico basado en la certidumbre por la “epistemología del riesgo”. Asimismo, sugiere un mayor acercamiento entre ciencia y filosofía para superar la actual confusión y estancamiento que afectan a estos saberes. Este artículo analiza ambos temas. -/- Los Sótanos del Universo proposes the necessity of changing the epistemology of apodictic scientific-philosophical knowledge, based on certainty, for the “epistemology of risk”. Furthermore, it suggests a better approach between (...) philosophy and science in order to surpass the confusion and standstill that affect these disciplines today. This paper analyses both matters. (shrink)

The notion of the human embryo is not immutable. Various scientific and technological breakthroughs in reproductive biology have compelled us to revisit the definition of the human embryo during the past 2 decades. Somatic cell nuclear transfer, oocyte haploidisation and, more recently, human stem cell-derived embryo models have challenged this scientific term, which has both ethical and legal repercussions. Here, we offer a legal perspective to identify a universally accepted definition of ‘embryo’ which could help to ease and unify the (...) regulation of such entities in different countries. (shrink)

En manuscritos sobre el sentimiento y la voluntad publicados en el segundo y tercer volumen de los Estudios sobre la estructura de la conciencia (XLIII/2-3), Husserl plantea el interrogante sobre si existen expectativas propias de la emoción y la voluntad (Hua XLIII/3, 285). Se refiere allí a las expectativas volitivas (Willenserwartungen) y a las expectativas emocionales (Gemütserwartungen). Con estos términos, se trata de describir formas de dirección hacia el futuro que difieren de las expectativas empíricas e intelectuales y pertenecen, en (...) sentido amplio, al ámbito de la emoción (Gemüt). A partir del análisis de una selección de manuscritos de dichos volúmenes, el trabajo se propone dilucidar el significado de estas formas de anticipación del futuro que involucran una tensión afectiva y una posición del futuro como horizonte práctico de realización de una meta, y tratar de esclarecer su diferencia respecto de lo que Husserl denomina "expectativas intelectuales" (o teóricas) y expectativas motivadas empíricamente. (shrink)

Ecological psychology is one of the most influential theories of perception in the embodied, anti-representational, and situated cognitive sciences. However, radical enactivists claim that Gibsonians tend to describe ecological information and its ‘pick up’ in ways that make ecological psychology close to representational theories of perception and cognition. Motivated by worries about the tenability of classical views of informational content and its processing, these authors claim that ecological psychology needs to be “RECtified” so as to explicitly resist representational readings. In (...) this paper, we argue against this call for RECtification. To do so, we offer a detailed analysis of the notion of perceptual information and other related notions such as specificity and meaning, as they are presented in the specialized ecological literature. We defend that these notions, if properly understood, remain free of any representational commitment. Ecological psychology, we conclude, does not need to be RECtified. (shrink)

Deep brain stimulation (DBS), a surgical procedure involving the implantation of electrodes in the brain, has rekindled the medical community’s interest in psychosurgery. Whereas many researchers argue DBS is substantially different from psychosurgery, we argue psychiatric DBS—though a much more precise and refined treatment than its predecessors—is nevertheless a form of psychosurgery, which raises both old and new ethical and legal concerns that have not been given proper attention. Learning from the ethical and regulatory failures of older forms of psychosurgery (...) can help shed light on how to address the regulatory gaps that exist currently in DBS research. To show why it is important to address the current regulatory gaps within psychiatric DBS, we draw on the motivations underlying the regulation of earlier forms of psychosurgery in the US. We begin by providing a brief history of psychosurgery and electrical brain stimulation in the US. Against this backdrop, we introduce psychiatric DBS, exploring current research and ongoing clinical trials. We then draw out the ethical and regulatory similarities between earlier forms of psychosurgery and psychiatric DBS. As we will show, the factors that motivated strict regulation of earlier psychosurgical procedures mirror concerns with psychiatric DBS today. We offer three recommendations for psychiatric DBS regulation, which echo earlier motivations for regulating psychosurgery, along with new considerations that reflect the novel technologies used in DBS. (shrink)

Non-representational approaches to cognition have struggled to provide accounts of long-term planning that forgo the use of representations. An explanation comes easier for cognitivist accounts, which hold that we concoct and use contentful mental representations as guides to coordinate a series of actions towards an end state. One non-representational approach, ecological-enactivism, has recently seen several proposals that account for “high-level” or “representation-hungry” capacities, including long-term planning and action coordination. In this paper, we demonstrate the explanatory gap in these accounts that (...) stems from avoiding the incorporation of long-term intentions, as they play an important role both in action coordination and perception on the ecological account. Using recent enactive accounts of language, we argue for a non-representational conception of intentions, their formation, and their role in coordinating pre-reflective action. We provide an account for the coordination of our present actions towards a distant goal, a skill we call distal engagement. Rather than positing intentions as an actual cognitive entity in need of explanation, we argue that we take them up in this way as a practice due to linguistically scaffolded attitudes towards language use. (shrink)

Obra ganadora de la VIII edición del Premio Internacional de Ensayo «Mariano Picón Salas». Propone una aproximación crítica a la “labor civilizatoria” del proyecto de la modernidad occidental que en pleno siglo xxi se reproduce a través de la hiper-conectividad que permiten las redes sociales y los dispositivos digitales. -/- It’s A Selfie World… denuncia, con intensidad expresiva, estilo osado y cautivante, los modos a través de los cuales se constituyen las subjetividades digitales que tienen como horizonte una consciencia transhumana (...) con la cual se afinan los ya complejos procesos de dominación cultural, económica y política, y se nos prepara para naturalizar nuevas formas de racismo, esclavitud y control social. (shrink)

The potential to collect brain data more directly, with higher resolution, and in greater amounts has heightened worries about mental and brain privacy. In order to manage the risks to individuals posed by these privacy challenges, some have suggested codifying new privacy rights, including a right to “mental privacy.” In this paper, we consider these arguments and conclude that while neurotechnologies do raise significant privacy concerns, such concerns are—at least for now—no different from those raised by other well-understood data collection (...) technologies, such as gene sequencing tools and online surveillance. To better understand the privacy stakes of brain data, we suggest the use of a conceptual framework from information ethics, Helen Nissenbaum’s “contextual integrity” theory. To illustrate the importance of context, we examine neurotechnologies and the information flows they produce in three familiar contexts—healthcare and medical research, criminal justice, and consumer marketing. We argue that by emphasizing what is distinct about brain privacy issues, rather than what they share with other data privacy concerns, risks weakening broader efforts to enact more robust privacy law and policy. (shrink)

Higher-Order Thought (HOT) theories of consciousness maintain that the kind of awareness necessary for phenomenal consciousness depends on the cognitive accessibility that underlies reporting. -/- There is empirical evidence strongly suggesting that the cognitive accessibility that underlies the ability to report visual experiences depends on the activity of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC). This area, however, is highly deactivated during the conscious experiences we have during sleep: dreams. HOT theories are jeopardized, as I will argue. I will briefly present HOT (...) theories in the first section. Section 2 offers empirical evidence to the effect that the cognitive accessibility that underlies the ability to report depends on the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex: dlPFC is the neural correlate of HOTs. Section 3 shows the evidence we have of the deactivation of this brain area during dreams and, in section 4, I present my argument. Finally, I consider and rejoin two possible replies that my opponent can offer: the possibility of an alternative neural correlate of HOTs during dreams and the denial that we have phenomenally conscious experiences during sleep. (shrink)

In having an experience one is aware of having it. Having an experience requires some form of access to one's own state, which distinguishes phenomenally conscious mental states from other kinds of mental states. Until very recently, Higher-Order (HO) theories were the only game in town aiming at offering a full-fledged account of this form of awareness within the analytical tradition. Independently of any objections that HO theories face, First/Same-Order (F/SO) theorists need to offer an account of such access to (...) become a plausible alternative. My aim in this paper is twofold. In the first place, I wish to widen the logical space of the discussion among theories of consciousness by offering a distinction, orthogonal to that between F/SO and HO theories, between what I will call 'Self-Involving' (SI) and 'Mental-State-Involving' (MSI) theories and argue in favor of the former one. In the second place, I will present the basics of a characterization of such a Self-Involving theory in Same-Order terms. (shrink)

Higher-order thought theories of consciousness attempt to explain what it takes for a mental state to be conscious, rather than unconscious, by means of a HOT that represents oneself as being in the state in question. Rosenthal Consciousness and the self: new essays, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2011) stresses that the way we are aware of our own conscious states requires essentially indexical self-reference. The challenge for defenders of HOT theories is to show that there is a way to explain (...) the required reference-fixing mechanisms that is compatible with the theory. According to Rosenthal, the reference to oneself as such is grounded in the disposition to identify the individual the HOT refers to as the individual who has that HOT. I argue that this leads to a vicious infinite regress on the more than plausible assumption that our cognitive capacities are limited. This leaves such theories without a foundation, since self-reference is thought essential to consciousness. (shrink)

Al final de su libro “La conciencia inexplicada”, Juan Arana señala que la nomología, explicación según las leyes de la naturaleza, requiere de una nomogonía, una consideración del origen de las leyes. Es decir, que el orden que observamos en el mundo natural requiere una instancia previa que ponga ese orden específico. Sabemos que desde la revolución científica la mejor manera de explicar dicha nomología ha sido mediante las matemáticas. Sin embargo, en las últimas décadas se han presentado algunas propuestas (...) basadas en modelos matemáticos que fundamentarían muchos aspectos de la realidad. Dos claros ejemplos provienen de Roger Penrose y Max Tegmark. Esto lleva a pensar en una posición no solo nomológica sino además nomogónica de la matemática. ¿Puede la Naturaleza estar fundada por las matemáticas como señalan algunos físico-matemáticos? Y en ese caso, ¿sería pertinente buscar una nomo-génesis de esta índole en la constitución de la conciencia? -/- At the end of his book “La conciencia inexplicada”, Juan Arana points out that nomology, explanation according to the laws of nature requires a nomogony, an account of the origin of the laws. This means that the order that we can observe in the natural World demands something prior to posit that specific order. Since the scientific revolution we know that the best way to explain that nomology has been through mathematics. Anyway, in recent decades a number of proposals based on mathematical models that found many aspects of reality has been offered. Two clear examples come from Roger Penrose and Max Tegmark. This drives us to think of a position of mathematics as not only nomological but also nomogonical. Can Nature be founded by mathematics as some physicists and mathematicians point out? And, in this case, would be relevant this kind of approach to search a nomo-genesis in the constitution of consciousness? (shrink)

Lezama, and later Deleuze, discovered that the baroque does not refer to an essence, but to an operative function. That operative function is the fold, which "curls and multiplies", as Lezama writes, and proliferates to infinity. We all know the examples with which Lezama placed his concept of the American baroque: the poems of Domínguez Camargo, those of Sor Juana, the architectures of the Kondori Indian, the baptismal fonts of Aleijadinho, "ornamented like accordions, with spiraloid leaves that ascend"; the chapel (...) of the Rosary, in Puebla, omamentada "without truce or free spatial parenthesis". This is how the fold operates, it is like a leprosy or a lichen -in the past, certain lichens were called leprosy-: it infests by enveloping and developing, it proliferates by setting in motion the fold-unfold pair. Lezama does not seek to reconfigure the sequences of history, but to superimpose other cycles on them, create gaps and vanishing points in chronological and causal narratives, divert the emphasis placed on cultures and redirect it to imaginary eras, until the meaning comes from a series of scales established in the historical. The eras would be ordered according to their potentiality to create images; thus it would be possible to establish the points where the image was imposed as history. The Carolingian imaginary era, for example, forged a link between the prodigies, the marvelous islands, the battles against the Saracens and theocratic reason. How are these scales established and how do they operate? How do counterpoint, images and links work? (shrink)

Animal replaceability is supposed to be a feature of some consequentialist theories, like Utilitarianism. Roughly, an animal is replaceable if it is permissible to kill it because the disvalue thereby caused will be compensated by the value of a new animal’s life. This is specially troubling since the conditions for such compensation seem easily attainable by improved forms of raising and killing animals. Thus, grounding a strong moral status of animals in such theories is somewhat compromised. As is, consequently, their (...) position as an alternative to rights-based theories in animal ethics. Recognising this, some utilitarians tried to disassociate utilitarianism and replaceability. I will here add my voice to this project. However, instead of seeing the culprit in the usual suspects (hedonism, maximisation or the total view), I advance a new proposal. After identifying that the compensating value for a disvaluable action has to be its consequence, I present a restriction on consequences: consequences of sequences of actions cannot be consequences of the isolated actions in the sequences. Given this, the main argument is simple: killing an animal is permissible only if the the value of the new animal’s life is a consequence of the killing; but this value is a consequence of a sequence of actions which involves the killing plus some additional actions; therefore, since, via the restriction, such value is not a consequence of the killing, it is irrelevant to its normative status. I then present two further motivations for the restriction: firstly, it prevents the value of conditional actions from trivially influencing the value of the actions on which they are conditional; secondly, it is useful – even if not a complete solution – to reply other objections to consequentialism: the accordion effect of action and the cluelessness problem. I finally consider a couple of objections. (shrink)

Peer competition and peer cooperation can be intuitively seen as opposing phenomena. However, depending on multiple factors, they might be complementary. In a population divided into groups, for instance, members of each group may cooperate with their peers in order to compete with neighboring groups. Alternatively, they may compete with their peers as a means of choosing the best cooperative partners and demonstrate that they are reliable cooperative partners. For instance, if subjects can choose with whom they wish to interact, (...) this may create competition to be more generous or loyal than others. (shrink)

Esta investigación retoma la obra de Gabriel García Márquez, Noticia de un secuestro (1996), con la volición de cuestionar la idea de Estado nación que está inmersa en el libro. Para ello, es necesario entender que la naturaleza del texto exige un conocimiento amplio al lector o al intérprete, puesto que su contenido revela datos multidisciplinarios. Además, es insoslayable realizar un análisis discursivo de la historia de ese contexto y cotejar con pasajes del mismo libro. Para facilitar esta labor, la (...) extrapolación de conceptos del teórico Luis Rodríguez Manzanera será de utilidad, ya que él despliega definiciones de Criminología, un tema frecuente en la obra. Verbigracia, la macrocriminalidad, una noción que él postula, permite que se comprenda la complexión del periodo histórico finisecular del siglo XX en Colombia, etapa que le corresponde a Noticia de un secuestro. Por otro lado, es menester dilucidar que este estudio no se reduce a lo literario, lo histórico y lo criminológico, sino que abarca distintas disciplinas, por lo que la exigencia en la consolidación epistemológica e interpretativa estará demostrada consuetudinariamente, sin obviar la inmanencia de la obra. Este tipo de análisis interdisciplinarios ya ha sido trabajado desde los Estudios Culturales, tal como se constata en las investigaciones de Richard Johnson (2000) o Néstor García Canclini (1997). De igual modo, el intento de establecer lineamientos y conexiones entre disciplinas como las de Literatura y Derecho ya ha sido desarrollado por Stanley Fish (1986), Faustino Martínez (2005), Carlos Pérez (2006) y Denise Schalet (2014). A diferencia de estos abordajes ya estudiados, el objetivo de esta investigación es detectar y fundamentar cómo se articula una propuesta ideológica desde una configuración que reanuda elementos históricos y literarios. En específico, lo que se busca es argumentar por qué fracasó implícitamente un proyecto sociopolítico de democracia y progreso, a partir de un panorama de violencia, narcoterrorismo, corrupción, negociaciones ilícitas, transgresión a los derechos humanos e inseguridad ciudadana. Con todo ello, esta tesis de maestría terminará siendo fructuosa para análisis postremos de discursos que tienen como esencia un soporte multidisciplinario. (shrink)

Considerando el contexto bélico y el surgimiento de las vanguardias a inicios del siglo XX, fundamento en este trabajo las razones por las cuales la presencia del concepto de nivola, atribuida por Miguel de Unamuno para hacer referencia a la técnica literaria que emplea en su novela Niebla (1914), suscita una confrontación posible entre universos compuestos por elementos de la realidad y lo virtual. En ese sentido, será propicio explicar el procedimiento que origina esa colisión de planos establecidos. Para (...) ello, recurriré a categorías literarias que sustentan las teorías de la ficción, según la percepción de Thomas Pavel y Marie-Laure Ryan. (shrink)

En esta entrevista, Itxaso del Castillo Aira relata sus experiencias al especializarse en el tópico del terror cinematográfico y televisivo; en rigor, se refiere a la técnica audiovisual del found footage. Películas como El proyecto de la bruja de Blair, Actividad paranormal y REC han desarrollado este recurso para emerger una impresión de realismo en la trama de estos largometrajes al momento de ser proyectados. Así como esta técnica, la investigadora propondrá otras categorías vigentes, tales como las de las monstruas (...) o los filmes estribados en un horror noire. De esa manera, queda constancia de que esta conversación permitirá a los lectores tener un conocimiento más profundo sobre este tema del terror, que a muchos no deja de cautivar. (shrink)

To explain the evolutionary emergence of uniquely human skills and motivations for cooperation, Tomasello et al. (2012, in Current Anthropology 53(6):673–92) proposed the interdependence hypothesis. The key adaptive context in this account was the obligate collaborative foraging of early human adults. Hawkes (2014, in Human Nature 25(1):28–48), following Hrdy (Mothers and Others, Harvard University Press, 2009), provided an alternative account for the emergence of uniquely human cooperative skills in which the key was early human infants’ attempts to solicit care and (...) attention from adults in a cooperative breeding context. Here we attempt to reconcile these two accounts. Our composite account accepts Hrdy’s and Hawkes’s contention that the extremely early emergence of human infants’ cooperative skills suggests an important role for cooperative breeding as adaptive context, perhaps in early Homo. But our account also insists that human cooperation goes well beyond these nascent skills to include such things as the communicative and cultural conventions, norms, and institutions created by later Homo and early modern humans to deal with adult problems of social coordination. As part of this account we hypothesize how each of the main stages of human ontogeny (infancy, childhood, adolescence) was transformed during evolution both by infants’ cooperative skills “migrating up” in age and by adults’ cooperative skills “migrating down” in age. (shrink)

This capstone project aimed to develop an offline computer-based assessment (CBA) tool that uses a computer instead of a traditional paper test in evaluating student learning. This addresses the difficulties faced by teachers in administering quarterly assessments. Incorporating technology into student assessment can increase student interest because of the immediate feedback generated automatically and can help teachers improve their work performance. This capstone project employed a developmental approach and utilized a modified ADDIE (Analysis, Design, and Development) model to design the (...) tool using Microsoft PowerPoint and Excel. Ten experts in mathematics, ICT, and assessment validated the face and content validity of the developed CBA tool. Based on the panel’s evaluation, the developed offline CBA tool in Statistics and Probability has passed all the assigned criteria, such as functionality, usability, efficiency, technicality, and accessibility. Overall, the developed CBA tool is suitable for use to address assessment-related issues. (shrink)

Contra recent, inflationary views, the paper submits a deflationary approach to legal ontology. It argues, in particular, that to answer ontological questions about legal entities, we only need conceptual analysis and empirical investigation. In developing this proposal, it follows Amie Thomasson’s ‘easy ontology’ and her strategy for answering whether ordinary objects exist. The purpose of this is to advance a theory that, on the one hand, does not fall prey to sceptical views about legal reality (viz., that ontological truths about (...) legal entities are established by metaphysical principles); and, on the other, is compatible with common-sense jurisprudence (viz., that there in fact exist legal entities, and they all have important practical implications). While this methodology is common to legal philosophers interested in elucidating the ‘artifactual nature’ of law, the paper departs from their projects by taking a step forward in connecting this deflationary approach to legal ontology with an expressivist account of legal discourse, thus providing enough resources to satisfy the general ambition of jurisprudence, viz., to establish the conditions for the analysis of legal reality and its normative character. (shrink)

Entrevista realizada a Audrey Louyer sobre la Literatura peruana fantástica.

Este documento registra la entrevista al comunicador social Juan Manuel Rojas, gerente general de Creative Forward Films SAC (en el Perú), que ha realizado estudios orientados al tema audiovisual en la Universidad Inca Garcilaso de la Vega, la Universidad Católica Argentina y la Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú. El propósito de esta conversación fue que se conociera de manera panorámica en qué consiste la formación de un comunicador y cómo esta es de utilidad para emprender un trabajo dirigido a la (...) práctica de lo audiovisual. Con las experiencias del entrevistado, se consigue construir una idea del universo cinematográfico en cuanto al desarrollo de los guiones y sus estructuras, el dominio especializado del lenguaje como herramienta fundamental y persuasiva para la publicidad, la crítica a las producciones de cine, los concursos que se promueven para respaldar la labor de los directores, etc. (shrink)

Representations are not only used in our folk-psychological explanations of behaviour, but are also fruitfully postulated, for example, in cognitive science. The mainstream view in cognitive science maintains that our mind is a representational system. This popular view requires an understanding of the nature of the entities they are postulating. Teleosemantic theories face this challenge, unpacking the normativity in the relation of representation by appealing to the teleological function of the representing state. It has been argued that, if intentionality is (...) to be explained in teleological terms, then the function of a state cannot depend on its phylogenetical history, given the metaphysical possibility of a duplicate of an intentional being that lacks an evolutionary history. In this paper, I present a method to produce, according to our current knowledge in genetic engineering, human-like individuals who are not the product of natural selection in the required sense. This variation will be used to shed light on the main replies that have been offered in the literature to the Swampman thought experiment. I argue that these replies are not satisfactory: representations should better not depend on natural selection. I conclude that a non-etiological notion of function is to be preferred for characterizing the relation of representation. (shrink)

En esta entrevista se formularon preguntas al magíster Iván Martínez, docente universitario destacado por sus conocimientos especializados en infraestructuras de redes y por sus múltiples participaciones en eventos académicos. Los interrogantes que se le plantearon se basaron en sus recientes enfoques de estudio, como el empleo de la herramienta informática de Microsoft Azure. En la conversación se llega a comprender cuál es su utilidad y cómo esta puede servir al usuario en distintos ámbitos, como el laboral. Por otro lado, el (...) ingeniero de Sistemas concluye con el modo en que sus saberes son transferidos a sus alumnos con mucha prerrogativa. (shrink)

Esta entrevista se hizo a uno de los miembros de la Academia Hondureña de la Lengua, Víctor Manuel Ramos. Entre los aportes que el académico expresó, fue su contribución a la comunidad intelectual a través de estudios lingüísticos y literarios. En concreto, estos se apreciaron en el Diccionario de las Lenguas de Honduras; Literatura y su producción literaria de índole infantil. Para que ello fuera posible, el entrevistado comentó cómo fue su proceso de formación, el cual fue un tanto complejo, (...) ya que tuvo que descartar algunas filiaciones y presuntas voliciones, tales como las que pretendía hallar desde la Medicina. Finalmente, lo que se concluye de esta conversación es el logro que se puede conseguir para la sociedad después de que uno se prepara concienzudamente, sin obviar el aprendizaje que se deriva de la experiencia personal. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This article offers the first step in an ongoing project of revisiting the foundations of latinidad and lo latinoamericano by focusing on the exclusions enacted by the history of these concepts and the cultural and political identity that comes with them. In conversation with Susana Nuccetelli and Omar Rivera, the author focuses on two emblematic authors in the history of Latin American philosophy (Simón Bolívar and José de Vasconcelos) that are usually read as offering a novel, liberatory conception of (...) the Latin American reality/identity, categorically different from European and Anglo-American conceptions. This common reading of some of the foundational texts on Latin American identity, however, conceals not only the active, textual removal of Blackness in the construction of this identity, but also the literal subtraction of Black bodies, lives, and histories from the Latin American nations and communities. Both of these elements are an explicit part of the philosophical programs of Bolívar and Vasconcelos. The article shows how the thought and political practice of these two authors, celebrated in different ways as foundational of what we understand as Latin America today, exemplify the exclusionary historical demarcation of latinidad. (shrink)